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MEETING THE SPIRIT OF SPARROW: 
THE REGIONAL FISHERIES COMMITTEE AS A 
MANAGEMENT MODEL IN CANADA 
ANNA Puattt 
ABSTRACT 
This comment engages in an analysis of the response by regional 
branches of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to the SCC 's 1990 
decision in R. v. Sparrow. The decision recognized aboriginal fishe1y 
rights and mandated increased consideration and consultation for 
aboriginals when setting quotas for regional fisheries. The comment 
examines d?ffering strategies implemented in British Columbia and the 
Yukon, concluding that a new approach is required in British Columbia 
!f the consultation mandated by Sparrow is to be meaningfully imple-
mented 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R. v. Spar-
row,' the federal government, through the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO), released a program entitled the Aboriginal Fisheries 
Strategy (AFS). This strategy, through the provision of funding and 
resources, was intended to integrate First Nations into fisheries manage-
ment in Canada. Among the aspects that would be affected by integra-
tion were conservation and protection initiatives, as well as develop-
ment tools and maintenance of fish harvest management systems. 
t The author is a second year student at Dalhousie Law School. She completed a B.A. in 
English Literature and Profossional Writing at the University of Victoria in 200 l. The author 
was born and raised in Whitehorse, Yukon, and will return to the Yukon to practice law. 
1 [1990] I S.C.R. 1075, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 [Sparrow]. 
268 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
In the initial press release, the DFO recognized that the government 
of Canada "must first meet (its) obligations to Aboriginal people." This 
statement was qualified, however, by the seeming caveat that followed, 
which noted that "(Canada) must also have a commercial fishery that is 
profitable and stable."2 Background documents for the program state 
that the agreements negotiated between First Nations and DFO are 
intended "to create cooperation over fisheries management; to respond 
and meet First Nations desires for greater participation in fish manage-
ment; to respond per the SCC's ruling in Sparrow; and to create the 
infrastructure to carry out the strategy. "3 
What the fisheries strategy and the accompanying background docu-
ments did not address was exactly how cooperation between govern-
ment and First Nations would be initiated. This strategy, while laying 
out an obligation and a plan for addressing that obligation, failed to 
define what precisely was meant by "participation in fishery manage-
ment," nor what consultation would mean in terms of actions by DFO. 
Further, while recognizing the need for both aboriginal involvement and 
a strong, profitable fishery, the AFS program did not articulate how the 
inevitable conflicts between the two would be resolved. 
The task DFO is mandated to perform is one that requires caution 
and precision. They must set quotas which will satisfy the demands of 
the principles of conservation, while allowing for a "profitable and 
stable" fishery. Sparrow added consultations with First Nations to this 
balancing act, providing for participation by First Nations representa-
tives who could come to consultations relying upon potentially conflict-
ing scientific data and unique principles of sustainability. 
As the AFS was implemented across Canada, the difficulty created 
by conflicting projections with regard to sustainable harvest quotas 
rapidly became apparent in the Pacific region. For nearly a decade now, 
First Nations in BC have annually taken part in the consultation process, 
only to be overridden as a matter of ministerial discretion where their 
recommendations differed from DFO sustainable catch targets.4 As a 
2 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release, NR-HQ-092-73E, "Crosbie Announces 
Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy in Atlantic Canada" (9 September 1992). 
3 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Aboriginal Fisheries Strategv, B-HQ-92-30, 
"Backgrounder I: The Program" (September 1992). 
·1 Fisheries Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. F-14, s. 7( 1) [Fisheries Act]. Under the Act, the Minister is 
authorized, in his absolute discretion, to issue licences for commercial fisheries. Such issuance 
includes terms such as total allowable catches, or quotas. 
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result, First Nations in some areas are left with the choice of either not 
fishing, or fishing within a total allowable catch they believe is set too 
high to be sustainable. Such a situation is surely not what the court in 
Sparrow envisioned. 
While claiming to respond to Sparrow, DFO's policy ultimately 
falls short of its mandate. Conservation is, logically, paramount to any 
fish management strategy, but the conflict between claims of primacy 
for First Nations rights to fish for ceremonial and food purposes, and the 
demands of the commercial fishing lobby, is not currently reflected in 
management strategies in BC today. In addition, there is no evidence 
that the native recommendations are being adopted as a part of the 
consultation process that the AFS prescribes. 
This article provides a brief and narrow comparative analysis of 
fisheries in two management areas where the local First Nations have 
traditionally fished the stocks available, namely the salmon fishe1y of 
the upper Yukon River in the Yukon Territory, and the herring fishery of 
the Nuu Chah Nulth on the west coast of Vancouver Island, BC. Both 
fisheries fall under the auspices of the Pacific Region Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans. However, in the case of the Yukon, DFO has 
created an integrated fisheries management plan that provides a compre-
hensive strategy to allow sustainable harvests, with deference given to 
First Nations food fisheries and to the creation of fishery management 
strategies within the self-governing agreements of the affected First 
Nations peoples. 
In Barkley Sound, where the Nuu Chah Nulth historically fish 
herring and herring roe on kelp, the lobby of the commercial industry 
has long outweighed the voice of First Nations' principles of sustainable 
fisheries. While integrated fisheries management plans are in place, the 
continuing practice of DFO is to consult and subsequently override First 
Nations recommendations where they conflict with DFO-proposed 
catch quotas. This is arguably detrimental not only to the sustainability 
of fisheries in Barkley Sound, but also to the relationship between the 
Nuu Chah Nulth and the federal government for all aboriginal claims 
negotiations. Therefore, because the mandate to consult has no defined 
meaning in BC, Sparrow's requirement of federal deference to s. 35 
rights exists, at a basic level, on paper but not in practice. 
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II. THE SPARROW DECISION 
Sparrow was the precedent-setting case that established a constitutional 
right to fish as a part of s. 35 aboriginal rights. 5 Sparrow, a member of 
the Musqueam Indian Band, was convicted at a trial level of fishing with 
a drift net that was longer than the maximum length stipulated in the 
British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.6 On appeal, the Court 
held that the Constitution Act, 1982 7 permitted the regulation of fisher-
ies for conservation and management purposes. This meant that the 
protection of the aboriginal right to fish in order to secure food did not 
entail a freedom of First Nations peoples from regulatory measures.8 
The SCC adopted the Court of Appeal's holding that regulation for 
conservation and management purposes was paramount to, and a neces-
sary infringement of, Aboriginal rights to fish for food, social, and 
ceremonial purposes. However, the Court also added that, after conser-
vation and management goals are attained, First Nations fisheries must 
as a matter of constitutional principle take priority over commercial and 
recreational fishing. Under conservation initiatives, therefore, commer-
cial and recreational fisheries must bear the brunt of reduced quotas and 
closures; only when conservation measures cannot be met without 
restrictions to First Nations fisheries will such restrictions be ordered.9 
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE 
As a result of the Sparrow decision, DFO was compelled to re-evaluate 
the hierarchy intrinsic to fisheries management. Theoretically, the con-
sequence of the decision was that commercial fisheries would thereafter 
defer to aboriginal fisheries for food, ceremonial and social purposes. 
DFO issued a response to the Sparrow decision, outlining how the 
5 Sparrow, supra note I. 
6 S.O.R./1984-248, s.12 ands. 27(1)(4). 
7 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
8 Sparrow, supra note I at para. 9. 
9 Sparrow, supra note I at 77, applying R. v. Jack, [ 1980] 1 S.C.R. 294. 
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department would address this new mandate. Thus, the Aboriginal 
Fisheries Strategy was implemented across Canada. 
Each fisheries region appears to implement the essential portions of 
the AFS with slightly different aspects. This seems to be due to vari-
ances in how First Nations and their claims are addressed across the 
country. In the Pacific region, the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy identi-
fies the following three objectives: 
I. To provide Aboriginal people with opportunities to fish for food, 
social and ceremonial purposes In a manner consistent with the 
Sparrow decision and provide for the co-operative management 
of these fisheries. 
2. To provide a role for the Aboriginal community in the manage-
ment of Aboriginal fisheries through AFS agreements which in-
cludes: 
• Co-operative fisheries management. 
• Economic development opportunities for First Nations. 
• Pilot projects for the sale of fish. 
3. The AFS is also meant to avoid or minimise disruption of non-
aboriginal fisheries. This is being accommodated by the voluntary 
licence retirement of commercial licences, transfer of allocation 
to aboriginal communities for pilot sales projects, and the issu-
ance of commercial licences to Aboriginal communities. 10 
The AFS in British Columbia is also designed to be an interim arrange-
ment between the federal government and the BC First Nations, while 
negotiations over treaties and self-governing agreements continue be-
tween the Crown, the Province and individual First Nations. 11 
1. Fisheries in the Yukon 
In the Yukon, though the territory is still technically covered under the 
Pacific AFS scheme, arrangements for salmon fisheries, including the 
Yukon River fishery, are facilitated by the Yukon Salmon Committee 
(YSC). The Committee was created in 1995, as a paii of the arrange-
10 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, "Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy Pacific Region" (6 
September 2002), online: DFO Pacific Region, AFS Homepage <http://www.pac.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/ops/fm/AFS>. 
II Ibid. 
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ments between governments and First Nations under the Yukon Um-
brella Final Agreement (UF A). 12 Comprised of representatives of 
twelve First Nations, 13 as well as commercial and recreational fishers, 
the YSC advises DFO on all aspects of salmon management in the 
territory, including research, legislation, policies, programs, and harvest 
quotas for salmon stocks returning to the Yukon. The YSC is accord-
ingly referred to as "the main instrument of salmon management in the 
Yukon". 14 
First Nations Fisheries in the Yukon are managed through a commu-
nal licensing process under the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licence 
Regulations 15 enacted under the Fisheries Act. 16 The YSC implements 
the consultative process for determining Integrated Fisheries Manage-
ment Plans (IFMPs) for both Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences 
and for commercial, recreational and domestic licences. After consulta-
tion and determination by the YSC of annual projected salmon returns, 
the YSC provides recommendations to DFO. If a salmon run is likely to 
provide an undersized harvest, affected First Nations are alerted, both to 
this fact and to the corresponding likelihood of a closure, at the consul-
tative level rather than at the implementation level. 17 
Once recommendations are made to DFO, the government has the 
final say in setting allowable quotas or implementing closures under the 
IFMPs. This is subject to the priority granted to First Nations fisheries 
12 Umbrella Final Agreement, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Government of the 
Yukon, Yukon First Nations (represented by the Council for Yukon First Nations), (29 May 
1993) at c. 16 [Umbrella Final]. The Umbrella Final Agreement is a framework document 
developed between the 14 recognized First Nations in the Yukon, the Government of Canada 
and the Yukon Territorial Government. The UFA acts as a template for the development and 
implementation of individual First Nation Land Claims Final Agreements and Self-Governing 
Agreements. Presently, eight First Nations have signed Final and Self-Government Agree-
ments, while another five First Nations have signed an Agreement in Principle under the UFA. 
13 Representation consists of two representatives from the Champagne and Aishihik (Alsek 
River) and Vuntut Gwitchin (Porcupine River) First Nations and a further two representatives 
from the Council of Yukon First Nations (representing ten First Nations in the Yukon River 
Drainage). 
14 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 200 I Yukon Y. T. Chinook and Chum Integrated 
Fishe1y Management Plan at s. 4.5.1. 
15 S.O.R./1993-332. 
16 Fisheries Act, supra note 4. 
17 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Interdepartmental Memo, Consultations Within Fish-
eries and Oceans Canada, Andrea Wilson, A/Regional Negotiator & Executive Secretary, 
Yukon Salmon Committee (July 2002). 
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over other fisheries. As DFO maintains communications and works 
closely with the YSC throughout the consultation process, the resulting 
recommendations are generally anticipated by DFO and adopted di-
rectly into the annual IFMP. 18 Once target escapements are assured to 
have been met, the First Nations fishery can take place. 
The result of the YSC process has been to provide a very clear 
communication system between DFO and the First Nations who rely on 
the fishery for food sources. Criticisms of the process focus around the 
costs of travel for consultation and the continual struggle of First Na-
tions to find qualified people to spearhead the consultation process, one 
of many mandatory consultations under the UFA framework for inter-
governmental collaborative schemes. 19 
One of the clear benefits of the YSC consultation process is that 
"consultation" in this context is clearly defined by the UF A.20 The 
necessity of this is illuminated by the contrasting situation in BC, where 
the meaning of consultation is vague, and it is unclear what weight the 
Minister must give to any information gathered through consultations. 21 
2. Fisheries in BC 
In BC, the AFS works as a series of agreements that are generally 
implemented on an annual basis. The agreements take the fonn of 
Watershed Agreements, Contribution Agreements and Fisheries Agree-
18 Ibid. 
19 Under the UFA and individual First Nations self governing agreements, consultation is 
required for any activities within a First Nation's traditional territory. Due to the broad 
spectrum of activities in traditional territories, coupled with a relatively small population in 
many communities, First Nations often do not have enough qualified people for the number of 
consultations that occur. 
20 Umbrella Final, supra note 12 at c. I. Under the UFA, "Consult" or "Consultation" means to 
provide: (a) to the party to be consulted, notice of a matter to be decided in sufficient form and 
detail to allow that party to prepare its view on the matter; (b) a reasonable period of time in 
which the party to be consulted may prepare its view on the matter, and an opportunity to 
present such views to the party obliged to consult; and (c) full and fair consideration by the 
party obliged to consult of any views presented. 
21 The criticisms of the BC process include a lack of fair notice for consultations and no 
indications of full and fair consideration of any views presented: Interview of A. Wilson, A/ 
Negotiator and Executive Secretary, Yukon Salmon Committee, by author (18 November 
2002). 
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ments. This article focuses only on the contents of Fisheries Agree-
ments, which represent the heart of the AFS. 
Fisheries Agreements provide for the allocation of food fisheries 
and suggest that the Minister, while retaining the discretion to set quotas 
at levels he or she deems fit, will take under advisement the recommen-
dations made by the First Nation who is party to a Fisheries Agreement 
with DFO. In reality, it appears that very little weight is given to the 
recommendations First Nations may provide themselves. 
Between 1987 and 1994, DFO maintained a catch ceiling in place 
for the herring fishery in Barkley Sound.22 DFO records show that with 
the ceiling method, the quota for herring was exceeded by approxi-
mately 1,800 tons, or 20 percent per year.23 In 1995, under pressure from 
the Nuu Chah Nulth and conservation groups, DFO switched to a pool 
quota for Barkley Sound.24 This was in place for two years, during 
which time commercial fishery hauls remained slightly under quota and 
herring populations appeared to flourish. 25 In 1997, however, DFO 
reverted to the old system of an imposed ceiling quota for Barkley 
Sound. 
The Nuu Chah Nulth, through their fisheries agreement with DFO, 
voiced their strong opposition to this. The Nuu Chah Nulth noted that, 
using purse seining gear, the fishery would reach the quota rapidly. 26 It 
was likely, the First Nation warned, that each boat would fish heavily 
and the quota would be exceeded without DFO even realizing it. This, as 
22 A catch ceiling refers to the fisheries management scheme where individual boats fish for 
whatever quantity of fish they can pull in throughout the course of a time-limited fishery, 
subject only to the maximum catch totals for the region. At the end of the fishery opening, 
DFO tallies the weight or number of fish taken in total from a given area. If the number is 
under the ceiling limit, another opening may occur. If the quantity taken is over the limit, there 
is no recourse to rectify the overage. 
23 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, "Roe Herring and Herring Spawn-on-Kelp Fact Sheet" 
(26 November 2002), online: Fisheries and Oceans Canada Pacific Region <http://www-
comm. pac.dfo-mpo .gc .ca/pub 1 i ca ti ons/factsheets/species/h erring_ e.h tm>. 
24 Pooling is a term used to describe a voluntary grouping of licences, a concept that controls 
the rate of catch by limiting the number of vessels that enter the water. This technique has been 
demonstrated to effectively reduce catch overages in the seine fishery. Each pool is required to 
average and monitor their own catches, while any overage goes to the quota of another pool 
that has not yet fished. (ibid.) 
25 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, DFO Science Stock Status Report, B6-04 (2002), 
"West Coast Vancouver Island Herring" (9 October 2002) [DFO Science Stock Status]. 
26 Nuu Chah Nulth Tribal Council, "'Feeding Frenzy", online: Nuu Chah Nulth Tribal Council 
Homepage <http://www.nuuchahnulth.org/fishfuture.htm> ["Feeding Frenzy"]. 
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it turned out, was exactly what happened - though the ceiling quota was 
set at 4,500 tons, the fleet harvested some 7,000 tons, exceeding the 
quota by 75%. DFO switched back to pool allocations in 1998, but to 
date the stocks have not recovered to pre-1997 levels. 27 
DFO states that other factors, such as unfavourable ocean condi-
tions, have also played a role in the slow recovery of the stock.28 The 
Nuu Chah Nulth contend, however, that even if oceanic conditions play 
a role, the fact that DFO still allows commercial fishing in the Sound is 
contrary to conservation principles and to the Sparrow mandate to allow 
the First Nation priority in the fishery. 29 
Studies have further shown that the herring spawn on eelgrass has 
been disrupted in the Sound.30 As the spawn is what the First Nation 
primarily harvests, this is a significant disruption in their fishery, and 
consequently of their ability to exercise their s. 35 rights as recognized 
by Sparrow. 31 They have been unable to attain their spawn on kelp 
harvest quotas for the past three years, while commercial fishing contin-
ues. 32 What appears to happen is that DFO consults the Nuu Chah Nulth, 
which voices its opposition to the quotas suggested, after which the 
DFO-recommended quota is implemented as though that consultation 
had never occurred. Such consistent results suggest that the DFO grants 
the consultative process little true respect. 
27 DFO Science Stock Status, supra note 25. 
28 DFO Science Stock Status, supra note 25. 
29 "Feeding Frenzy", supra note 26. 
30 Alberni Environmental Coalition "Herring Threatened in Barkley Sound" ( 1999), online: 
A lberni Environmental Coalition http://www.portaec.net/l ibrary/ocean/ 
herring_in_barkley_sound_threate.html>. For further statistical data on total spawn in area, 
also see: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Herring Spawn Tables, West Coast of 
Vancouver Island, sub-area 232, West Barkley Sound (20 November 2002), online: DFO 
Pacific Region Scientific Division <http://www.pac.dfompo.gc.ca/sci/herring/herspawn/ 
tables/wcvimapf.htm>. 
31 "Feeding Frenzy", supra note 26. 
32 Due to low forecast returns, the commercial fishery was closed in 200 I, but reopened again 
for 2002, with commercial harvest catch at 0.8 tons. (DFO Stock Status Report, supra note 
25.) 
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IV. FISHING PRIORITY AND s. 35 RIGHTS 
If a differing level of sustainable harvest is identified between DFO and 
the affected First Nation, and DFO chooses to adopt its own level of 
harvest rather than the one the first nation recommends, DFO forces the 
first nation into a difficult position a position, noted the Federal Court 
of Appeal recently in Kitkatla Band v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans), which raises serious questions about the protection of s. 35 
rights.33 
In Kitkatla, the Federal Court of Canada dismissed an application by 
the Kitkatla Band for an injunction against the implementation of a 
commercial test fishery within a specific area of the northern BC coast 
near Prince Rupert. The applicant band had been unable to harvest their 
allowable traditional food quota over the previous four years, due to a 
lack of herring roe spawn in Kitkatla Inlet. DFO planned to implement a 
commercial test fishery, a plan that went unopposed in many areas but 
which was of concern to the Kitkatla band, due to the relatively small 
area in which they hoped to harvest their food quota. The issue was not 
whether the commercial fishery was sustainable within the area as a 
whole, but whether Kitkatla Inlet could both accommodate the fishery 
and provide for the needs of the Kitkatla Band. Adding to the complex-
ity of the matter was the fact that commercial harvesters, in implement-
ing their fishery, would actually kill the herring prior to the spawn 
occurring. 
First Nations fishers, on the other hand, would implement their 
fishery at the time of spawn, either taking the roe off the kelp beds or 
inducing the herring to spawn in enclosures, after which the herring 
would be released. 
Given that the commercial fishery would happen first, the Kitkatla 
Band claimed theirs. 35 rights would be violated by allowing the fishery 
to go ahead. The band argued that a test fishery which killed fish in a 
small area where they traditionally harvested roe would likely result in 
the band not achieving its annual allowable harvest. 
While consultations did occur throughout this process, and other 
Nations did endorse the test fishery scheme, the Court held that the 
result for this particular band, and their particular fishery, was that their 
33 [2000] F.C.J. No. 383 at 18 [Kitkatla]. 
MEETING THE SPIRIT OF SPARROW: ... 277 
rights would in all likelihood be violated, and their fish stocks deci-
mated further, by the continuance of a commercial fishery in Kitkatla 
Inlet.34 At the very least, the Court held, the IFMP for 2000 raised 
serious questions about the Fisheries Minister invoking his unilateral 
authority under s. 7(1) to allow the fishery to proceed in the face of his 
mandate to accord priority to Aboriginal fisheries. 35 
Ultimately, however, the injunction was refused, and the test fishery 
proceeded on the grounds that the First Nation did not show that they 
would suffer irreparable harm if the fishery went ahead. After all, the 
Court noted, the aboriginal fishery had been below quota for years. 36 If 
the test fishery caused that result again, such a result could not be 
characterized as irreparable harm, just business as usual. 
While this holding applied the correct law regarding grounds for 
obtaining an injunction, the reasoning seemed to confine itself to an 
excessively narrow view of the situation. The Court ignored the fact that 
the high volume of fish taken by commercial fisheries played a large 
role in forcing First Nations to demand injunctions in an attempt to 
preserve their food resources. While not immediately demonstrable, 
given the First Nation still exists in its traditional territory, it is arguable 
that the First Nation, in relation to its historic state, has already suffered 
irreparable harm at the hands of the herring roe industry and DFO's 
management practices. That the harm is ongoing does not demonstrate 
that the harm has not occurred. The Court, in its decision, looked only at 
the context of the one proposed fishery, not where that fishery was 
situated within the scope of the Kitkatla Band's relations with DFO and 
commercial roe fishing in general. 
A corollary observation to this is that DFO, in the exercise of 
ministerial discretion in such a case, forces a First Nation into court 
proceedings in order to protect its ability to fish for food and ceremonial 
purposes. Such action appears to neutralize any assistance the AFS is 
purported to provide First Nations in the exercise of theirs. 35 rights. 
If precedence is to be accorded to First Nations to achieve their food 
fisheries, fish management must be designed in such a way that guaran-
tees the aboriginal quota is met first, prior to the commencement of any 
commercial harvests (even test harvests). One partial solution is to 
34 Ibid. at I 8-19. 
35 Kitkatla, supra note 33 at 20. 
36 Kitkat!a, supra note 33 at 20. 
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regard the First Nations fishery as a test fishery itself, under the premise 
that DFO should not be able to licence a commercial fishery under 
circumstances where a small fishery guaranteed by the Constitution 
cannot be sustained. This is complicated by the fact that some First 
Nations fisheries occur after the commercial fishery, such as terminal 
salmon fisheries and the harvesting of roe off kelp beds. Again, while 
prioritized on paper, the First Nation fishery tends to bear the brunt of 
any unexpected dips in harvest levels in situations where they are the 
last to fish their quotas. 
Continued refusal on the part of DFO to meaningfully consult and 
prioritize the First Nation fishery will not only lead to distrust and 
scepticism on the part of First Nations toward the AFS and IFMP 
process, but quite possibly to further deterioration of all treaty negotia-
tions and consultations with the federal government. The federal gov-
ernment has a fiduciary duty to First Nations peoples, and these negotia-
tions and consultations are important aspects of that duty. Ultimately, 
First Nations recommendations are subverted by the ministerial discre-
tion that requires consultation, but doesn't define what the consultation 
means or how it is to be applied to quotas. 
To claim that aboriginal rights are receiving deference, as mandated 
by the Sparrow decision, in an area where commercial fishers have a 
significant economic stake, is a fallacy that is recognized and con-
demned by many First Nations across BC.37 Increasingly, First Nations, 
with the support of smaller, community-based commercial fishing en-
terprises, are demanding that DFO consider moving towards a region-
ally based fisheries management program for the Pacific coast. Such a 
management scheme would likely mimic the salmon committee imple-
mented in the Yukon, although regional fisheries would cover a smaller 
geographic scale than the Yukon plan. It could further include provi-
sions for a workable definition of "consultation", coupled with require-
ments for the Minister to demonstrate the use of such consultations in 
detennining quotas. 
Such a move has met resistance from large commercial operations, 
such as BC Packers. Owned by the Jim Pattison Group, it is the largest 
37 For e.g. comment from "Feeding Frenzy", supra note 26; treaty discussions of the Lheidli 
T'enneh Band on the Upper Fraser River, Regional Fisheries Management Workshop, 23 
October, 2002; Kitkatla, supra note 33; Campbell v. British Columbia (A.G.), [2000] B.C.J. 
No. 1524 (QL). (Nisga'a Nation as intervener) 
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exporter of roe herring in Canada.38 DFO submits that the development 
of a regional fisheries management scheme is also hampered by the 
division among neighbouring First Nations with regard to sustainable 
quotas and allocations of allowable catches.39 This criticism of region-
ally based programs appears to ignore the fact that differing opinions on 
allowable catches occur under the present program as well. The differ-
ence would be that debates over allowable catches would occur at a 
regional discussion table, as occurs in the Yukon now, as opposed to 
during individual negotiations between each First Nation and DFO, as is 
currently the case in BC. 
Regardless of the potential pitfalls of creating regional fisheries 
management strategies across BC, it is evident from the current state of 
fisheries management that the status quo is falling short of the mandate 
articulated in Sparrow to accord First Nations priority in fisheries. If the 
Federal Court of Appeal has already recognized that the unilateral 
actions of the Minister raised serious constitutional questions in the case 
of the Kitkatla, it appears likely that it will only be a matter of time 
before a First Nation chooses to bring about a test case on the constitu-
tional validity of current fisheries management practices in BC.40 
Rather than wait for court action to effect change, DFO has the 
opportunity now to utilize some of the regional fisheries management 
practices as they exist in the Yukon and apply it to fisheries policy in 
BC. Though there would undoubtedly be areas where the management 
template of the YSC would fall sh01i of the needs of BC fisheries 
management, any step in the direction of Yukon-style regional fisheries 
management strategies would be a positive step, implementing the spirit 
of the law set out in Sparrow rather than the hollow letter of the law we 
see in place under Sparrow today. 
38 Corporate Statistics, "The Jim Pattison Group - Canadian Fish Products", online: The Jim 
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